No sympathy from me for Lehman Minibonds investors

After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and the unwinding of the credit markets over the past year or so, several Singaporean investors have found themselves burnt, having dumped significant portions of their retirement savings in credit derivatives and other similar financial instruments. One of these products in particular, Lehman's Minibonds, has been completely wiped out following the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Lehman brothers.

Now, several of these investors (losers), are crying and complaining to the MAS, claiming that the authority did not do enough to protect them from the risks of these investments that are now close to worthless. As quoted in the Straits Times...

ST Sep 24, 2008
Minibonds worry: 'How is the layman supposed to beware when the prospectus is filled with jargon that even the sellers do not fully comprehend?'

MY WIFE and I are joint account holders of Maybank Singapore. We purchased $100,000 of the Minibonds Series 5 from Maybank's investment banker around August last year. We were under the impression then that these were supposedly very safe bonds.

Every few months, I would even call up Maybank to ask about the performance of our Minibonds and whether I should still hold on to them. Each time, I was informed that these bonds were still sound, and there wasn't any need to bail out.

Now that Lehman Brothers is bankrupt, and the public disclosure that our Minibonds investment has, in fact, nothing at all to do with bonds, but are instead Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO)-related derivatives, we are extremely disappointed, distressed and upset with Maybank's lack of professionalism and poor product knowledge.

The investment advisers are more interested in closing the deal and going through the motions during the investors' risk-analysis.

We fully understand the concept of buyer beware. However, in this situation, how is the layman supposed to beware of what they're being sold when the 60-odd-page prospectus is filled with legalese and technical jargon that even the sellers themselves do not fully comprehend?

Ngo Chee Keong

Nice try mr Ngo, but I think people like you are idiots.

If you don't understand the legalese and technical jargon in the prospectus, WHY THE HELL ARE YOU TOUCHING THE INVESTMENT?

And, if you know that the sellers themselves do not fully comprehend the jargon, WHY ARE YOU STILL BELIEVING WHAT THEY SAY?

Anybody with any knowledge about investing will have heard one of Warren Buffett's principles of investing: Only invest within your circle of competence.

DON'T TOUCH WHAT YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND

Obviously mr Ngo did not heed Warren Buffett's advice, just like thousands of other 'investors' who got burned by Lehman's bankruptcy.

And now he looks like the idiot he really is.

The minibonds saga should be a poignant lesson to everyone on why you should NEVER TRUST 'FINANCIAL ADVISORS'. Always DO YOUR OWN HOMEWORK. And DON'T TOUCH WHAT YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND.

Those who diligently do their homework, educate themselves on financial instruments and how to invest well don’t get FOOLED by these so-called ‘financial advisors’

Any tom dick or harry can get a CFP or become a personal banker. just talk to insiders and they will tell you how selfish, mercenary and unethical these financial salespeople are. All they care about is getting their commission.

They DON’T GIVE A SHIT ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE THEY ARE SELLING TO.

The best and only real protection for your retirement savings is to arm yourself with knowledge and financial education.

The best investors have never depended on the regulator to protect their downside.

These are universal principles of investing that will stand the test of time. Whether it was the go-go- years, the tech bubble, or today's credit crunch. Follow them and you will avoid the hazardous damages to your retirement nest.

-------------
update:

The former CEO of NTUC, Tan Kin Lian, has now called on the MAS to be pro-active, and to 'protect' the small investors' interests:

"I hope that the Monetary Authority of Singapore or the Attorney General can take similar action on behalf of retail investors in Singapore, who had been misled into investing in the Mini-Bonds and similar structured products. These investors were clearly misled by the relationship managers into investing in these products on the advice that these investments were safe.

It is time to hold the financial institutions accountable for their mis-selling activities and for our regulators to be pro-active."

Indeed, how easy it is to point the finger at the bank, the broker, and the fund manager for misleading you. It is easy to point the finger at the regulator.

But, it looks like somebody agrees with me. here's a letter countering Tan Kin Lian's statements in the st forum:

ST Forum - Sep 25, 2008

Ultimately, it's buyer beware

I REFER to Tuesday's report, 'MAS tells banks to give priority to worried investors'.

It may be presumptuous of Mr Tan Kin Lian to assume that the banks erred in selling structured products to retail customers. These products are regulated under the Financial Advisers Act and the Securities and Futures Act. Only qualified advisers can market and give advice on such products. They must have a reasonable basis for any recommendation that is made on structured products and must provide investors with a fair description of all material information.

Be that as it may, investors looking to invest in these complex structures should exercise extra caution before entering into such financial transactions. The decision to invest should be based on your own judgment and not solely on advice given by the bank or its advisers. Before investing, you should consider whether the products fit with your financial goals, risk appetite and personal situation.

Understand the features of structured notes. Even in the case of a 'principal protected' product, the principal may only be insured by the issuer and, thus, may be lost in the case of a liquidity crisis or other solvency problems with the issuer.

Structured products are not suitable for all investors. Each product can exhibit very different characteristics as well as associated risks and rewards. They may appear to be fixed-income instruments, but may contain embedded options which do not necessarily reflect the risk of the issuing credit. These options may be 'plain vanilla' or highly leveraged exotic options.

As each is unique, the risks inherent in any one structured note may not be obvious. Hence, read carefully the prospectus or pricing statement, which explains the risks, tax treatment and other important information in detail.

Ultimately, it is your responsibility to protect your own interests. If you do not understand how the product works, seek clarification with your adviser. Don't buy anything that you do not understand.

Jag Kuo Soon Yong

Goodbye, Ricky Wong. Singapore Will Miss You

In latest developments regarding Singapore's NGNBN, City Telecom, formerly the consortium lead of Infinity consortium, has pulled out of the race for NetCo, reports Reuters:

StarHub leads group in S'pore broadband network bid
Wed Aug 20, 2008 1:13am EDT

SINGAPORE, Aug 20 (Reuters) - StarHub Ltd, Singapore's No. 2 telecoms firm, will lead the consortium bidding to build the city-state's next-generation broadband network, consortium member MobileOne said on Wednesday. StarHub replaces Hong Kong's City Telecom (CTI) who has dropped out.

Qatar Investment Authority, the Middle Eastern state's investment vehicle, has also joined the consortium, the statement said. (Reporting by Jennifer Tan; Edited by Saeed Azhar)

© Thomson Reuters 2008.

The silence of City Telecom on why this happened will certainly leave interested observers puzzled and curious as to the cause of this recent events. This is especially so considering the tremendous enthusiasm displayed by Ricky Wong, CEO of City Telecom and de facto leader of Infinity, for Singapore's NGNBN.

Ricky's interview with the Business Times demonstrated that he was a man with a dream – to ensure that in five years there would be fibre to most homes in Singapore. Ricky's vision was for Singapore, along with Hong Kong, to become a model for the rest of the world.

"The Americans and Europeans will come here to learn and follow us. We will become the technology leaders.”

This was a dream that would surely have benefited Singapore, and Mr Wong reckoned that tech-savvy people worldwide would then see that Singapore would be the best place to live, work and play – better than Silicon Valley, because it would have the best infrastructure. Unfortunately, for better or for worse, Ricky and his team are no longer in the running for the multi-billion dollar NGNBN project.

Can Infinity deliver without him? CTI's departure must have been due to significant developments in the NGNBN NetCo tender. Starhub and M1 are still around, but CTI's involvement was Infinity's trump card. CTI's unparalled experience with FTTH networks in Hong Kong is no longer part of Infinity's package. Now that the Hong Kongnese are no longer around, one wonders how much steam there is left in Infinity's bid.

Meanwhile, OpenNet's consortium members will surely be quietly smiling to themselves in the light of this new development. With CTI gone, there is no foreign technical expertise in the Infinity consortium, OpenNet will surely hold the edge with Axia's solid experience in operating open access fibre networks, along with mighty SingTel backing the group.

Yet, the tender process is not over, and we might see surprises again.

But for now, all I can say is, goodbye Ricky. Your vision for Singapore was an inspiring, compelling one. Those who knew your vision for the country will surely miss you.

Singapore's Quality of Life vs Sweden's

This has got to be one of the best written letters in the ST Forum on Singapore's quality of life and how it's not really as good as the Singapore government makes it out to be. I append it here for my future reference. Emphasis added by me.

For more information on this topic, see "Quality of Life is more than Material Wellbeing: GDP as an Incomplete Measure of Singapore's Development"

Swede quality of life

I REFER to Ms Heng Siew Cheng's letter, 'Why one couple is resettling in Sweden'', (July 17) and the replies by Singapore Senior Minister of State for Finance and Transport, Mrs Lim Hwee Hua (July 22), and 'Where else can you buy your home in 5 years?'' by Mr Peter Wadeley (July 24) My Singaporean wife moved to Sweden in 2001. She gave birth to our first child, a boy, last November. We are now on holiday, extending our first flush of joy of parenting in Singapore with my wife's family.

My wife, a teacher, is on a year's maternity leave. I am on paternity leave for 45 days here. When I return home, I shall still be on paternity leave for three more months. The generous duration of our parental leave is mandated by the state. Mr Wadeley implies that Singaporeans can buy a home in five years. I disagree. Last year, the median household income was $4,870. Even with grants, an average family cannot pay off a flat that quickly. It is also unachievable for Ms Heng and her Swedish husband, even if their collective income barely breaches the HDB's $8,000 bar.

Mrs Lim's comparison is incomplete. Nine in 10 Singaporeans merely lease their homes (HDB flats are typically 99-year leaseholds). Freehold ownership is higher in Sweden: Forty per cent live in landed property, 20 per cent in freehold condos and 40 per cent in rental flats. Swedish rental flats are akin to HDB flats. The main differences are that there is no downpayment, and the rental contract does not expire.

It is true, as Mrs Lim says, that Swedes spend 13 per cent of their income on housing. But for the money, half of us have our own garden - and precious time - to play with our children.

She suggests it is less expensive to raise children here. It is true that consumer goods are cheaper here and Singapore ranks third globally in per capita GDP (purchasing power adjusted) and Sweden 12th, according to the World Bank. But as more of Singapore's GDP comprises imports and exports, the statistic does not reveal the extent of benefit to its citizens.

The World Bank uses Household Final Consumption Expenditure (HFCE) as an affordability benchmark. Including goods and services provided by the government, it tells how much one has for useful spending, either directly or through tax. Sweden's HFCE per capita, in 2005 figures, is US$30,000, (S$42,000) double Singapore's US$14,000.

Ms Heng is concerned about raising children here. Having lived in both countries, I agree. The United Nations' Human Development Index, based on 350 indicators, tracks 'a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living'. Sweden ranks sixth worldwide, while Singapore trails at 25th.

I am not advocating the adoption of Sweden's welfare system wholesale. But, if Singapore adopts a tiny part, giving parents flexibility and cheaper childcare, it probably means a tax hike of just a few per cent.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to Ms Heng to Sweden.

Jan Sundström

Singapore's SWFs and the 3 Behemoths of Mass Implosion

What do UBS AG, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup have in common?

A. They're all banks which have received significant cash infusions from Singapore's Sovereign Wealth Funds, GIC and Temasek.

B. They're the 3 largest casualties of the ongoing credit crisis.

Behemoths of Mass Implosion

Meredith Whitney, one of the most prominent Wall Street bank stock analysts, recently put out research notes either downgrading or cutting financial estimates for the three banks:

Merrill, rated “underperform,” faces “headwinds of deleveraging and the next disruptive step of restructuring.” ...

Ms. Whitney says she continues to “be negative in our outlook on Citigroup due simply to the fact that the company has seriously constrained earnings power, in addition to the writedowns seen in 2Q08,” which she estimates will hit $12.2-billion. ...

UBS is rated “underperform” by Oppenheimer because the Swiss bank “faces a difficult task of navigating through its risk exposures from the investment bank and rebuilding its damaged wealth management franchise.”

Whitney's pessimisim is not without good reason. UBS AG, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, have been the banks with the largest total bank writedowns to date, far and ahead of the rest of their peers:

Citigroup leads the pack, with UBS and Merrill trailing close behind. But the gap between these three banks and the rest is extremely large - HSBC is the next closest with about half of Merrill's damage.

The same three banks lead in another key statistical metric: writedowns/market cap ratio:

This time, Merrill leads the charge. UBS and Citigroup fare better on this ratio, but still are way higher than the rest of the pack.

The stock markets have, in turn responded to the financial carnage the banks have inflicted on themselves: Merrill, Citigroup and UBS are amongst the top 5 % decliners in stock price:

Meanwhile, the 1-year performance of the stocks have indeed been nothing to envy:


The Dubious Wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew

Lee Kuan Yew just a month ago made some comments about GIC's splendid investments in Citigroup and UBS:

"The franchise of the banks, the expertise that they have, under proper leadership, they will be able to recover and rise again ... Will there be another Swiss bank like UBS for wealth management? I doubt it, we doubt it, that is why we invested in it." Citigroup, he added, had "an enormous spread worldwide as a retail bank".

These statements have indeed turned out to be questionable, if not downright wrong. UBS' 'unparalleled' wealth management franchise appears to be undergoing an unparalleled tax evasion investigation:

UBS shares hit by talk of further losses, tax evasion case
Jun 23, 2008

ZURICH (AFP) — Shares in Swiss banking giant UBS plunged on Monday amid talk of further losses and as investors worried that a US tax evasion case around a former employee could widen to the bank itself.

At the close, UBS shares showed a fall of 4.42 percent to 22.06 Swiss francs on the Zurich stock exchange, after a loss of 3.27 percent on Friday. The overall market was down 0.60 percent.

In a note to investors, an analyst at Credit Suisse warned that UBS's wealth management could come under "significant pressure" if the tax evasion investigations broadens to a case directly impacting the bank.

"In a worst case scenario, UBS could lose its banking license which could have adverse effects on the global private banking franchise," she wrote.

On Sunday, Swiss newspaper Sonntag reported that US law enforcement officials had made a formal request to come to Switzerland to investigate a tax evasion case involving UBS.

The move has been sparked by the confession of former UBS banker Bradley Birkenfeld to a Florida court last week that he conspired to help US clients dodge millions of dollars in taxes.

Swiss officials from the justice and finance ministries have already travelled to Washington for talks with their US counterparts amid concern the case could damage the overall reputation of Switzerland's financial industry.

The subprime damage and the suspected tax evasion has had severe consequences for the top leadership of the bank:

UBS AG (UBS) was at the center of a tornado of crushing news Tuesday, as it announced major changes to its board amidst pressure from the U.S. Department of Justice to reveal the names of top clients taking advantage of the bank’s tax breaks.

Four of the No. 1 Swiss bank’s board members - Stephan Haeringer, Rolf Meyer, Peter Spuhler and Lawrence Weinbach - will step down at the bank’s Oct. 2 shareholder meeting.

...

The bank has been the biggest European casualty to the U.S. subprime-mortgage crisis. It has written down more than $38 billion in the last three quarters, and its stock has dropped more than 57% year-to-date.

Continuing that trend, the bank will likely post a second-quarter loss with another markdown of about $4.9 billion, according to Bloomberg News estimates.

UBS said it will immediately submit board-member recommendations to the governance committee and will explore redefining directors’ and management’s responsibilities.

So, not only has UBS taken a severe beating in the subprime mortgage crisis, its wealth management business is undergoing severe pressures as well.

How about Citigroup's "enormous spread worldwide as a retail bank"? Well, it seems that is turning out to be a liability, rather than an asset.

Citigroup plans to sell $400 billion in assets
International Herald Tribune
By Eric Dash; Friday, May 9, 2008

Vikram Pandit is doing some serious spring cleaning at Citigroup.

Since becoming chief executive in December, Pandit has been clearing out the corporate attic of weak businesses and unloading worrisome assets at bargain-basement prices.

In an effort to streamline the sprawling company and placate restive shareholders, Pandit has sold or closed more than 45 branches in eight states. He has also disposed of Citigroup's headquarters building in Tokyo and its investment-banking base in New York and ditched more than $12.5 billion in loans used to finance corporate buyouts. And he has jettisoned the Diners Club credit card franchise, Citi's commercial leasing divisions and a big pension administration unit.

Pandit is not done yet. After months of false starts, Citigroup is now trying to sell Primerica Financial, a life insurance and mutual fund company, according to people close to the situation. He is also looking to sell its back-office outsourcing unit in India and its Smith Barney brokerage firm in Australia. Some speculate he also may try to sell 340 bank branches in Germany, possibly to Deutsche Bank.

On Friday, at Pandit's first major presentation to investors and analysts, Citigroup said that it planned to sell about $400 billion in assets in the next two to three years.

As it turns out, Vikram Pandit is trying to get rid of many of Citigroup's assets. Citigroup's worldwide sprawl made it a giant behemoth to big to manage. On top of that, Vikram Pandit has absolutely no experience running a consumer bank. Does Lee Kuan Yew really like such a person managing Citigroup's wide retail sprawl?

Suffering the Consequences

Who is taking the brunt of all this financial damage? Ultimately, it is the shareholders of these banks. And although GIC and Temasek have incorporated some sort of short term guaranteed returns for their investments in the banks, ultimately, these investments will convert into equity and suffer the effects of dilution:

Shareholders take brunt of banks' capital raising
Saturday June 21, 7:26 am ET
By Joe Bel Bruno, AP Business Writer
Banks cutting dividends, diluting shares to raise badly needed capital

NEW YORK (AP) -- America's banks and brokerages are scrambling to raise badly needed cash, but it may be at the expense of shareholders.

Since the subprime mortgage market imploded, financial companies caught in the fallout have been raising capital in two major ways -- cutting dividends and issuing more shares. Both methods erode shareholder value; analysts believe the industry is poised for more.

"The market is now seeing a substantial increase in financial companies issuing common and convertible instruments in an effort to shore up liquidity," said Standard & Poor's senior index analyst Howard Silverblatt. "The additional financing gives them immediate breathing room, with the payback being longer term dilution."

Put plainly, their gain is your pain.

Just this past week, Fifth Third Bancorp Chief Executive Kevin Kabat needed a cash infusion of $2 billion to bail out his struggling regional bank, while KeyCorp CEO Henry Meyer needed $1.5 billion. Both will issue stock to boost their balance sheets.

Banks have raised more than $60 billion this year by selling common and preferred shares.

The issuance of new stock acts to dilute the value of current shareholders because profit gets split among more shares. It's like having the family over for a turkey dinner and at the last minute grandpa invites the neighbors, too. There'll be less for everybody.

The end of the credit crisis is no where in sight, and the banks have yet to see the light at the end of the tunnel. And from how things are going right now, that light seems quite far away.

The writedowns at the banks have resulted in corresponding losses in stock price. And dilution of shareholders returns due to capital raisings only add to these woes. These are real losses that Singapore's SWFs will suffer; the supposed downside protection they built into their investments are but a short-term illusion.

Were these investments a good idea? We will only know for sure in a few years time when we have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.

But the way things are going, the prospects for these investments simply don't look good at all.

Good on Temasek, Shame on the Government

On Recent Events

I have come to know, through very reliable sources, of an incident that has greatly enhanced my confidence in Temasek as being independent of government influence. This incident has greatly influenced my perceptions of Temasek and has deepened my understanding of the regulatory problems that Temasek is facing in Indonesia and Thailand.

Not too long ago, the top officials of a Singapore Government Agency (let's call it ABC) approached the top leadership of Temasek, seeking that Temasek influence one of the corporations (XYZ) under its control to enact a series of plans designed to produce a favourable regulatory outcome for ABC. This occurred because ABC feared that it would not be able to get XYZ to do what ABC wanted without Temasek's influence.

I am extremely happy to say that Temasek turned around to ABC and said that Temasek cannot and would not influence the management of the corporations under its control. This is despite the fact that Temasek could have tried to accede to ABC's requests and influence XYZ without risk of public knowledge. However, I feel that the officials of ABC should have known much better than to try to use the government's position as owner of Temasek to try to get Temasek to influence XYZ in ABC's favour.

Temasek and the Ministry of Finance have clearly stated repeatedly that Temasek is to act independently of the government as a financial investor. Temasek's role is thus not to produce political and/or regulatory outcomes for government agencies. Any act by Temasek to this effect would severely tarnish the credibility and reputation of Temasek in its operations, particularly considering the trouble it is going through with Shin Corp in Thailand and with Indosat in Indonesia.

Thus, I would go so far to say that ABC's behaviour was tantamount to an attempt to abuse one's position of authority and influence. It was a selfish act that only considered the individual interests of ABC without considering the potentially deliterious consequences to Temasek, the Ministry of Finance, and the rest of Singapore. I am hence extremely disappointed with the top officials of ABC. What they did was fundamentally irresponsible and unacceptable.

Once again, I would like to give credit to Ho Ching and Temasek for standing firm in not exercising its influence over XYZ, and hope that this behaviour is indicative of how Temasek conducts itself with the rest of its investments.

On PT Indosat

ST Telemedia has recently completed its divestment of its stake in PT Indosat to Qatar Telecom.

ST Telemedia completes $2.5b Indosat sale to Qtel
S'pore firm transfers stake that had been at centre of antitrust dispute. -ST
Chua Hian Hou

Tue, Jun 24, 2008
The Straits Times

QATAR Telecom (Qtel) has defied some political resistance to complete a controversial acquisition of a Singapore firm's stake in No.2 Indonesian telco Indosat.

The US$1.8 billion (S$2.5 billion) stake was transferred to Qtel by Singapore Technologies Telemedia (ST Telemedia), which held the shares in two holding companies. ST Telemedia is a unit of Temasek Holdings.

The Indosat stake that ST Telemedia held has been at the centre of a legal dispute since last year, when Indonesia's Business Competition Supervisory Commission, or KPPU, ruled that the Singapore firm had breached antitrust laws.

The KPPU claimed that Temasek had engaged in monopolistic practices in Indonesia's mobile-phone market, and had breached anti-competitive laws by holding majority stakes in more than one company in the same industry.

Temasek has a deemed stake of about 20 per cent in Indonesia's No.1 telco Telekomunikasi Selular (Telkomsel) held via SingTel. It also had a 31 per cent deemed stake in Indosat, held via its wholly owned unit ST Telemedia.

The KPPU fined the companies and also ordered Temasek to sell its deemed stake in either Telkomsel or Indosat. It also ruled that buyers could purchase the shares only in 5 per cent chunks at most.

Temasek, SingTel and ST Telemedia claimed that there was no breach of antitrust laws and appealed against the ruling in the Central Jakarta District Court.

But last month, the Indonesian court upheld the KPPU's ruling. The three firms then said they would appeal against this decision to the Indonesian Supreme Court.

But on June 7, ST Telemedia announced that it was selling its Indosat stake to Qtel.

It is unfortunate that ST Telemedia has had to elect to divest its lucrative stake in PT Indosat in order for its parent, Temasek, to avoid further complications in the antitrust lawsuit it is facing against KPPU. While not the most favourable outcome, practically it was probably the most prudent decision on the part of ST Telemedia.

In light of the incident I have narrated above, I have much more confidence in believing that Temasek exerted no strategic influence over its 'effective' stakes in PT Indosat (previously owned thru ST Telemedia) or Telkomsel (currently owned thru SingTel). In light of this, the regulatory decision by KPPU against Temasek probably holds little water and I am inclined to accept the arguments of Temasek's lawyers that Temasek is innocent of the claims of monopolistic practices brought against it by KPPU.

Yet this incident is exemplary of the problems that Temasek faces as it expands out of Singapore to make investments overseas. Even as Temasek makes its decisions on commercial grounds and independently of the Singapore government, its government-linked perception and the close ties to the government do Temasek no favours. Indeed, Temasek's status as a government owned entity is very much a liability when it comes to dealing with political and regulatory knock-on effects. Temasek's actions overseas incite political suspicion simply because it is owned by the Ministry of Finance, and not necessarily because the government actually exerts any influence over its actions.

On Shin Corp

How best, then, to deal with this problem? One solution would be not to take any majority stakes in any prominent or politically-linked foreign companies:

Singapore's Temasek plans to cut its stake in Thailand's Shin Corp
By Amy Kazmin in Bangkok, for the Financial Times
Published: June 18 2008 03:00 | Last updated: June 18 2008 03:00

SINGAPORE'S Temasek Holdings plans to reduce its stake in Shin Corp, the Thai group it took control of more than two years ago, through a public offering of shares.

In a statement to the Stock Exchange of Thailand yesterday, Shin Corp said it was drafting a prospectus for an offering that would increase the minority shareholding, although it also said it would have to monitor the investment climate and sentiment in order to "conduct a successful offering . . . in the future".

Shin Corp gave no details of a timeframe or size for such a deal.
In January 2006, Temasek paid $3.8bn, or Bt49 per share, for a 96 per cent stake in Shin Corp, the telecommunications-to-aviation group founded by Thaksin Shinawatra, who was then Thailand's prime minister.

The deal, Thailand's largest takeover, triggered a crisis as Bangkok residents protested against the Shinawatra family's $1.9bn tax-free profits from the deal.

Critics accused the Singaporean state investment agency of violating Thai laws limiting foreign ownership of telecoms companies to 49 per cent, though the deal replicated similar take-overs.

The furore culminated in the September 2006 coup and the seizure of most of the Shinawatra family's earnings from the sale.

The military government also vowed to investigate whether the takeover violated foreign investment laws.

Like the PT Indosat case, Temasek probably made the investment in Shin Corp in full compliance of the laws of Thailand as they knew it, and were unfortunate victims of the political turmoil in Thailand. In all fairness to Temasek, it had probably no inkling that the military coup and its subsequent fallout could have been triggered by the sale of Shin Corp by Thaksin Shinawatra to Temasek.

Yet in hindsight, the highly politically charged nature of the transaction should have raised alarm bells during Temasek's political due diligence of the transaction. Here was an asset of national pride, changing hands between the Prime Minister of the country and the investment arm of a foreign government body. Surely there had to be knock-on political ramifications.

But nevermind that, what is done has been done and we cannot turn back the clock. Yet Temasek's latest plan to cut its stake in Shin Corp only just having recently acquired it, is acknowledgement that an investment's political fallout is a burden too heavy for the company to bear. This mirrors ST Telemedia's decision subsequent to the KPPU case, on behalf of Temasek.

But adopting such a strategy going forward can place significant constraints on Temasek's investment options. It now has to carefully weigh the potential political ramifications of every investment it makes. Doing so would narrow the universe of potential investment and acquisition targets available to Temasek, and place downward pressures on Temasek's investment returns. That Temasek's assets under management continue to balloon, do it no favours either. Temasek has to deal with the double whammy of having more capital under its responsibility, and fewer options with which to deploy this capital.

Indeed, Ho Ching's job is certianly not one I would envy; it is a tough set of problems she has to deal with. But deal with these problems, she and her team must. Otherwise, it is time to reduce the scale and scope of Temasek, and start returning the money to the people.

Can Singapore's corporate elite come up with the solutions for such tough problems? Singaporeans will surely watch intently, and only time will tell.

Temasek’s Hands in Too Many Pies

In the latest news surrounding Temasek – related investments in Telecom companies, ST Telemedia has divested its entire stake in PT Indosat to Qatar Telecom.

Business Times - 09 Jun 2008
STT sells Indosat stake, giving Qatar firm a boost
ST Telemedia divesting its entire stake in Indonesian mobile operator

(DUBAI/SINGAPORE) Qatar Telecom (Qtel) is poised to be a major player in the Indonesian telecoms market with the announcement on Saturday that Singapore Technologies Telemedia is selling its entire stake in PT Indosat.

'We believe that Indonesia is a high growth market for telecommunications and that Indosat is very well placed to compete in that market,' said Qtel chief executive Nasser Marafih.

Qtel will pay US$1.8 billion for the 40.8 per cent stake in PT Indosat held by Asia Mobile Holdings, a joint venture firm between the Qatari outfit and STT.

ST Telemedia, a subsidiary of Temasek Holdings, will no longer have any involvement in Indosat after the transaction.

The disposal of the stake came after an Indonesian competition watchdog ruled that Temasek has breached the country's anti-monopoly laws and ordered the Singapore investment firm to divest its holdings in either PT Indosat or PT Telkomsel.

Temasek indirectly holds 35 per cent of PT Telkomsel via its 56-per cent owned unit Singapore Telecommunications Ltd (SingTel).

Temasek’s official line is that ST Telemedia’s board of directors made the divestment decision entirely independently of Temasek. Independence might be true at an operational level, in the sense that the executives handling the divestment and the executives handling the anti-monopoly lawsuit do not know about what each other are doing. However, we can be quite sure that top level executives at Temasek were fully cognizant of all developments at STT which led to the decision to divest the PT Indosat stake, in light of the legal developments in Indonesia.

STT’s latest move in divesting PT Indosat is the latest in a string of developments that can be traced directly to Temasek’s nature as a Singapore government-owned investment agency; the Shin Saga is probably the incident that is most vivid in our minds. While Temasek and its subsidiaries may have complied with the law (according to its lawyers), its close links to the Singapore government and ruling family have presented unpleasant problems as the company ventures overseas and makes investments abroad.

Foreign governments, for whatever reason, have seen it unfit for Temasek to exert too much influence on their countries’ corporate scenes; the spectre of a tiny country owning massive stakes in prominent corporations has lead to anti-competitive lawsuits, tax-evasion attacks and pretty much anything else plausible in the legal arsenal to make sure that Temasek feels the pain of its corporate expansion. And as the saying goes, once bitten, twice shy.

The aftermath of the Thai military coup and the resultant pain felt by Temasek subsequent to stock market losses on Shin Corp must surely have fueled the rapid decision by STT to divest its PT Indosat stake, for fear of potential losses to PT Indosat or further legal penalties that Temasek might have had to suffer as a result of the ongoing legal action in Indonesia. Indeed, there is no other plausible explanation - the PT Indosat stake is such a lucrative investment that ST Telemedia would certainly not have made such a divestment except under duress.

These recent events only serve to underscore the challenges that Temasek faces going forward – its massive capital base, extensive reach in many companies, and undeniable politically-linked image mean that Temasek will see itself facing the prospect of anti-competitive suspicions and political reactions from foreign governments. Indeed, it would certainly be no surprise if Temasek’s investment analysts have added a new dimension to their investment risk analysis – the risk of political backlash, a risk quite unique to Temasek. These risks will only serve to grow as the corporation extends its reach and as the funds under its care expand in size.

And so perhaps it is time for the government to rethink its strategy with regards to its management of its sovereign wealth, and perhaps consider some sort of proper privatization of the GLCs under Temasek’s ownership. For instance, the Indonesian antitrust case would certainly not have happened if Temasek did not control SingTel. Or Temasek might be seen to be much more independent from the Singapore government if it underwent some form of privatization, perhaps an IPO and listing and the attendant enforced corporate disclosure.

Whatever the case, maintaining the status quo is definitely unsatisfactory. Temasek will see its investment mandate constrained by attempts to avoid political backlash from the foreign countries it seeks to invest in. One thing is for sure – repeated press releases claiming that Temasek acts independently of the government and independently of its subsidiaries are too little and too lousy.

It is time for Temasek and the Singapore Government to do better.

Oil continues its inexorable advance...

As a follow up to a post I made some time back about Lee Kuan Yew's comments on oil, here are a few articles recording the historic highs in oil prices reached earlier this week:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9c732bb8-33c2-11dd-869b-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1

http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/oil-up-almost-11-mark/story.aspx?guid=%7BB3A39E99-D68C-4872-AD8F-752CF3735888%7D

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/06/business/06oil.php